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Abstract: Political economics predicts that the rich oppose redistribution and vote for 
conservative parties. Although this seemingly fits the data well in most countries, I show 
that the relationship breaks down when we control for unobservable characteristics. 
Using Norwegian survey data, I study to what extent voting is caused by income. 
Although a positive association between income and conservative voting persists when 
controlling for unobservables, the magnitude of the effect is reduced by a factor of five. 
To correct for measurement error, I instrument income with average income by 
profession. The magnitude of the coefficients becomes higher, but the main conclusion 
remains. 
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1 Introduction 
Workhorse models in political economy and public choice subsume 
that, at least on average, a rich person prefers a lower tax rate than a poor. 
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The reason is simple: The richer you are, the more taxes you pay whereas 
the benefits remain the same or decline. This is a crucial element of much 
of political economics, such as the median voter approaches to tax 
determination (Romer, 1975; Roberts, 1977; Meltzer and Richard, 1981), 
probabilistic voting approaches (Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Lindbeck and 
Weibull, 1987), and models of special interest groups (e.g. Grossman and 
Helpman, 2001). If income does not determine voting, this literature may 
simply be flawed. 
The Meltzer-Richard model, for instance, implies that there is more 
redistribution the more unequal a society is. Empirically, however, there is 
no general tendency that unequal societies redistribute more than equal 
societies.1 A proper understanding of the relationship between income, 
preferences for redistribution, and actual voting is a key to understanding 
this “redistribution puzzle”. 
Apparently, the standard political economy prediction of the rich 
opposing redistribution and voting for conservative parties seems to fit 
the data well. Figure 1 shows opinions on tax cuts for high incomes and 
support for the Conservative party by income quintile for a sample of 
Norwegian respondents.2 Respondents in the higher income groups are 
supportive of tax cuts and they support the Conservative party. 
Preferences for tax cuts are doubled and conservative voting almost 
tripled in the 5th quintile relative to the 1st and 2nd. 
But this analysis is too simple.  First, observable characteristics such as 
gender and education may have an impact. The conclusions are essentially 
unchanged if we control for such variables, though. What should be of 
greater concern are unobservable characteristics that create a spurious 
correlation between income and conservative voting. There are at least 
two groups of unobserved differences between agents that we should 
worry about: Social background and acquired beliefs and norms. 
Social background captures a set of value norms and views on the 
working of society learned at young age. Political sociology suggests that 
voting is determined by location in social structure and party 
identification acquired during childhood and adolescence. This means that 
voting behaviour is heavily affected by the conditions under which a 
person grew up – persons growing up in a rich and conservative family 
tends to vote for conservative parties when adults as well. Among the first 
serious studies of this relationship is Lazarsfeld et al. (1948) seminal study 
where the emphasis is on the importance of socioeconomic status.3 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Bénabou (1996) and Lind (2005) for surveys of these findings. 
2 A description of the data is given in Section 3. Income before 1993 is based on the 
simulation technique described in Section 2. 
3 Where the level is assigned by interviewers, who are “trained to assess the homes, 
possessions, appearance, and manner of speech of the respondents and to classify them 
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Figure 1 - Stated Preferences for Tax Cuts for High Incomes and Fraction Voting 
Conservative by Income Quintile (cumulative 1977-2001) 
 
 
They find a strong relationship between measured socioeconomic status 
and voting behaviour. Campbell et al. (1960) emphasize instead party 
identification as a major determinant of voting. They claim that: “[A]n 
orientation toward political affairs typically begins before the individual 
attains voting age and [...] this orientation strongly reects his immediate 
social milieu, in particular his family” (p. 146f).4 There is also a 
voluminous literature on class voting. Very generally, working class 
background is a good predictor of socialist vote.5 A related approach is the 
model of Corneo and Grüner (2000), where middle class voters oppose 
redistributing to preserve their social standing relative to the poor. Class 
background is clearly correlated with income, but this relationship is not 
causal. In sum, these three channels indicate that there is a correlation 
between income and conservative voting, but where income has no causal 
                                                                                                                                     
into their proper stratum in the community according to a set quota. The people with the 
best homes, furniture, clothes etc., i.e., the ones with most money, would be classed as 
A's; and the people at the other extreme would be D's” (p. 17). 
4 Niemi and Jennings (1991) confirm the finding that parents play a major role in shaping 
the offspring’s party identification using parent-offspring panel data. See also e.g. 
Berglund (2004) for a recent study of the Norwegian context. 
5 For instance Nieuwbeerta and Ultee (1999) confirm this on a large number of countries, 
and the relationship also holds over time, although the strength of class has been 
declining in most countries. 
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effect on voting behaviour. Hence a change in income will not cause to a 
change in voting behaviour. 
The voting decision also depends on beliefs and norms, and these are 
shaped by own past. Piketty (1995) models social preferences and thus 
party identification through learning. There is disagreement about the 
disincentive effects of taxation, and agents learn about the working of the 
economy through their own experiences as well as that of their ancestors. 
This generates left-wing dynasties who don’t believe in a large degree of 
social mobility, and hence favour more redistribution than right-wing 
dynasties, which in general has experienced more upward mobility. The 
mechanism is also used in Alesina and Angeletos’s (2005) model, where 
preferences for redistribution are shaped by fairness norms, which in turn 
are shaped by economic behaviour. Both approaches generate positive 
relationships between income and preferences for low taxes. 
To the best of my knowledge, there are no studies that estimate the 
effect of personal income on voting, controlling for unobserved social 
background in a satisfactory manner. That is what I do in this paper, and it 
turns out that controlling for unobservables has a major impact on the 
estimated effect of income on voting behaviour. The estimation procedure 
is based on the assumption that during a limited period of time, 
unobserved characteristics remain constant, so they can be controlled out 
by an individual specific fixed effect. If a change in income over this 
period has an impact on expressed political preferences, the income 
change is the casual effect. 
I use panel data from the Norwegian Election Study for the seven 
elections between 1977 and 2001 where each respondent is interviewed 
after two consecutive elections. There are several reasons why Norway is a 
suitable country for this study. First, as it has a proportional electoral 
system, there are more than two parties and more than one “active” 
cleavage. Hence there is not the same tendency for convergence toward 
the middle that is found in most majoritarian polities. Second, there is a 
clearly right-wing party, the Conservative party, which could potentially 
attract voters from the whole electorate independently of religious beliefs 
or ethnic group. 
Estimation is based on a random utility framework that leads to a logit 
type choice structure.6 To see the effect of income when unobserved effects 
are not properly taken into account, I first estimate a random effects 
model. This model is only consistent if the unobserved component is 
uncorrelated with income, which I argued above is unlikely. However, 
this model mimics well the best approaches found in the literature. Under 
                                                 
6 The main reason for using a logit type choice structure is that this is the only parametric 
specification that allows consistent estimation of discrete choice models with fixed effects. 
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this specification, there is a strong and significant relationship between 
income and conservative voting. Next, I concentrate on voters who move 
from one party to another between two elections. Now the effect of income 
is much lower, indicating that income plays a smaller role in explaining 
vote changes. Finally, I introduce a fixed effects logit model to properly 
control for all unobserved effects. Now the effect of income becomes tiny, 
about 1/5 of the effect in the initial model, and the coefficient is no longer 
significant. This shows that the rich vote Conservative, but only to a 
limited extent because they are rich. Using an instrumental variables 
approach, I show that the results are not driven by increased attenuation 
bias when working on differentiated data. 
These unobservable characteristics imply that there are two types of 
comparative statics we can perform: First, we can condition on 
background and experience and change the agents’ income. This is what 
we associate with a mean preserving spreads, and gives the short run 
effect of a change in income. Second, we can change both income and 
background characteristics. Then we would expect to find the same effect 
as is found in cross sectional analyses ignoring unobservable 
characteristics of the agents. This is the long run effect of an income 
change, where the long run may be several generations. These analyses 
are fundamentally different, and it is crucial to use the right analysis to 
answer the question one is asking. 
There are several strands of literature studying the relationship 
between economics and voting behaviour. First, there are survey-based 
studies of the effect of income on preferences for redistribution (Husted, 
1989), taxes (Lewis, 1979; Furnham, 1984), and provision of public goods 
(Bergstrom et al., 1982; Gramlich and Rubinfeld, 1982; Preston and Ridge, 
1995). Mueller (1963) uses US survey data on opinions on government 
programs and possible tax changes. She finds some support for the 
hypothesis that those who benefit from a program are more positive to it 
than others. Sanders (1988) mostly confirms her findings, using a different 
methodology and more recent data. McCarty et al. (2003) find a positive 
relationship between income and Republican partisanship which has been 
strengthening over time. They argue that this is due to increased 
polarization as income inequalities have been increasing. However, they 
make no real attempts at controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in their 
study. Their findings have also been contested by Glaeser and Ward (2006) 
who find a declining magnitude in the positive relationship between 
country income and the share of Republican votes. In parts of the 
literature on voting, income is also used as a control variable, but again no 
attempts for controlling for unobservables is done, and most of the time 
little emphasis is put on income. It has also been found that persons who 
believe in upward economic mobility tend to oppose redistributive 
Lind: Do the Rich Vote Conservative Because They Are Rich? 
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/18 6 
 
policies and vice versa. In a large international survey, Corneo and Grüner 
(2002) find strong support for the hypothesis that those who expect to 
benefit from redistributive programs are more supportive of them than 
others. Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) find similar results on Russian data, 
and Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) confirm this result using US survey 
data. 
Another strand of literature investigates how the macroeconomic 
situations influence the incumbent party’s popularity. Douglas Hibbs 
(2000) has coined the term “bread and peace voting” for such behaviour. 
On time series data, Kramer (1971) had a seminal contribution. Using cross 
sectional data, one can distinguish between pocketbook (or egotropic) 
voting, i.e. how your own economic situation influences support for the 
incumbent party, and sociotropic voting, how the macroeconomic 
situation affects voting. There seems to be strong support for sociotropic 
voting but almost no support for pocketbook voting.7 Kinder and Kiewiet 
(1979, 1981) use cross sectional data to distinguish between pocketbook 
voting, i.e. how your own economic situation influences support for the 
incumbent party, versus sociotropic voting, how the macroeconomic 
situation affects voting. On US data, they find strong support for 
sociotropic voting but almost no support for pocketbook voting. Lewis-
Beck (1986) confirms these findings on data from Britain, France, 
Germany, and Italy. However, in the symposium on economic voting in 
Electoral Studies, edited by Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000), the overall 
conclusion is somewhat moderated. For most countries there is little 
support for pocketbook voting, but there are exceptions, most notable 
Denmark and the UK. 
2 Empirical Model and Estimation  
To estimate a model taking into account some of the features set out 
above, I equip each voter with a set of preference functions for each party 
available. We may interpret this as the agent’s utility of the given party 
coming to power. As there is little scope for strategic voting in 
parliamentary elections, it is natural that the agent also votes for the party 
he prefers to see in power. Generally, I will talk about the utility he 
expects to get from voting for a party, rather than from seeing the party in 
power, and leave the precise interpretation to the reader. 
Utility for a party depends on agent and time specific effects, his 
income, other back-ground variables, and a stochastic component. 
Assuming a linear structure, agent i gets utility 
 
                                                 
7 See e.g. Grafstein (2009) for an attempt at explaining this puzzle. 
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ݒ௜௝௧ ൌ ߙ௜௝௧ ൅ ߚ௝ݕ௜௧ ൅ ߛ௝ݖ௜௧ ൅ ߳௜௝௧                                  (1) 
 
from voting party j at time t. In the present work, I only study the effects 
of the current income ݕ௜௧. ߙ௜௝௧ is a latent party, period, and individual 
specific term, ݖ௜௧ individual characteristics other than income, and ߳௜௝௧ a 
standard extreme value distributed taste shifter. The extreme value 
distribution gives rise to logit-type choice probabilities, which simplifies 
the implementation of the maximum likelihood estimation.8 
Throughout the analysis, I use the specification ߙ௜௝௧ ൌ ߙ௜௝ூ ൅ ߙ௝௧் ൅
ߙ௝௉ where ߙ௜௝ூ  is the individual specific term, which I give different 
specifications outlined below, ߙ௝௧்  a time-party specific fixed effect, and ߙ௝௉ 
a parameter which applies if the agent is in his second period of 
interviewing. Since the model contains the period specific effects ߙ௝௧் , all 
effects related to incumbency, macroeconomic conditions, popularity of 
specific politicians, and so forth are controlled for. Standard political 
economics predict that ߚ௝ is high for right-wing parties and low for 
socialist or left-wing parties, which is the appropriate alternative 
hypothesis to test against the null hypothesis ߚ௝ ൌ 0 for all j. 
As a benchmark model, consider first a standard random effects model 
with normally distributed individual effects. The individual effects are 
here modelled as ሺߙ௜ଵூ , … , ߙ௜ேூ ሻᇱ~ܰܫܦሺ0, ∑ఈሻ, i.e. independent of income ݕ௜. 
Computationally, the model is estimated by Monte Carlo integration: First 
we draw a sequence of as from the appropriate distribution, then we 
calculate the implied choice probability for each draw, and finally average 
over all draws to find the likelihood of the data given the parameters.9 
For consistency, this model requires the random effects ߙ௜௝ூ  to be 
independent of ݕ௜௝௧ and ݖ௜௝௧. This is a strong and, as argued in the 
introduction, probably unrealistic assumption. Still, the model is included 
as it is the most efficient version of the models used in the previous 
literature. 
To solve the problem of unobserved effects correlated with income, we 
want the ߙ௜௝ூ ’s be time independent individual specific taste parameter. 
However, as the sample size increases keeping the number of periods each 
individual is observed fixed, the number of ߙ௜௝ூ ’s to estimate increases 
proportionally. This is Neyman and Scott’s (1948) incidental parameter 
problem. Andersen (1970), however, shows that if we can find a sufficient 
statistic for the incidental parameters, we may use conditional maximum 
                                                 
8 Notice, however, that since we have individual effects (either random or fixed), we do 
not have the problem with independence of irrelevant alternatives, and a large family of 
random utility models can be approximated (McFadden and Train, 2000). 
9 Full details can be found in Appendix B.1. 
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likelihood, i.e. we maximize the likelihood of the data conditional on a 
sufficient statistic for the incidental parameters. See also Cox (1975). 
Chamberlain (1980) has derived a conditional maximum likelihood 
estimator for fixed effects logit models and shown that knowledge of what 
parties an agent votes at some time is a sufficient statistic for the 
individual specific effects. We then use the order in which he votes these 
parties to estimate the parameters. I limit the exposition to the case of two 
periods as this is the case we encounter below. Also, for simplicity of 
notation, I omit the period specific and second period effects. Assume that 
individual ݅ votes for party ݌ଵ and ݌ଶ in period 1 and 2. Conditional on 
having voted for parties ݌ଵ and ݌ଶ, i.e. on one of the two voting sequences 
ሺ݌ଵ, ݌ଶሻ or ሺ݌ଶ, ݌ଵሻ, the probability of this observation is  
 
୔୰ሺ௣భ,௣మሻ
୔୰ሺ௣భ,௣మሻା୔୰ሺ௣మ,௣భሻ
                                              (2) 
 
In Whit the assumption of extreme value distributed residuals, the 
choice probabilities Prሺ݌ଵ, ݌ଶሻ and Prሺ݌ଶ, ݌ଵሻ have logistic structures where 
the individual effects enter multiplicatively. Hence they cancel out in this 
expression. Details of this derivation are given in Appendix B.2. 
This estimator is extremely robust to correlation between the 
unobserved individual effect and the explanatory variables. However, it is 
also a costly estimator as we only use those observations where the 
individual has changed the party he voted for and also loose information 
as we only consider within-variation in regressors and ignore between-
variation.10 
A final complication is that for the first periods in the sample, we do not 
have the precise value of the income ݕ௜௧, only an interval in which it lies. 
We could then use a dummy variable for each income group, but as these 
groups change over time, this would not be possible with a panel. Rather, 
I have used simulated maximum likelihood: I assume that a log normal 
distribution is a reasonable approximation to the income distribution in 
each period. Using the number of respondents in each income interval, we 
can then estimate the two parameters µ and σ, the mean and standard 
deviation of log income, for each period. The estimated parameters for the 
relevant years are found in Table 1. One could estimate the parameters of 
the income distribution jointly with the policy preference parameters, but 
                                                 
10 I have run most of the estimations shown below using another less costly, but also less 
robust estimator proposed by Chamberlain (1980). This estimator does not have 
individual fixed effects, but instead random effects that are allowed to be correlated with 
the average income over the two periods. It turns out that the results are similar to those 
obtained from the random effects estimator, so I have not included these results in the 
paper. 
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for computationally simplicity I use the two step procedure of first 
estimating the income distribution and then estimating the preference 
parameters by simulated maximum likelihood. Details on the procedure 
for simulating incomes are given in Appendix B.4. 
3 The Norwegian Polity and the Data Set 
The model is estimated on data from the Norwegian Election Study, 
made available through the Norwegian Social Science Data Services. The 
years 1977 to 2001, a total of seven elections, are used.11 The study is a 
rotating panel where most of the respondents participate in the survey in 
two consecutive elections. Each survey contains a large number of 
questions on the respondent’s opinion about political question as well as 
some background variables. Although the questions vary over time, there 
are some key questions that are asked each time. For our purposes, the 
most interesting are the party the respondent voted for and a statement of 
household income. Responses to opinions on economic policy was asked 
in a different way in 2001, so analyses of political opinions are restricted to 
a sample from 1977 to 1997. Income is measured by recall, and is a 
measure of last year’s income. With minor modifications, it has been 
measured by the question “What gross income did you (and your 
spouse/co-habitee) have [last year]? With gross income, we mean total 
income before any deductions or tax.” 
From 1977 to 1989 the respondents were only asked to identify their 
income group and not the precise income. As explained in Section 2, this is 
solved by using simulated maximum likelihood. Descriptive statistics on 
the simulated incomes as well as the stated incomes from 1993 to 2001 are 
found in Table 1. As expected, real incomes are increasing over the period. 
In the present work, I have included some results where I use CPI 
adjusted income, but I have relied mostly on incomes relative to annual 
averages, as this is what determine whether an agent gains or looses from 
a redistributive scheme with a linear tax. Also, I have only looked at the 
effects of income, ignoring the effect of wealth. The reason is that my data 
set does not have respondent’s wealth. Also, reliable data on wealth are 
hard to obtain for Norway. Estate taxation, which is an important part of 
taxation of wealth is in Norway determined at the local level, whereas I 
study (national) parliamentary elections. Finally, the two are usually 
                                                 
11 An overview of the whole data set is found in Kiberg et al. (2000). See Statistics Norway 
(1978) for documentation of the 1977 wave, Statistics Norway (1982) for the 1981 wave, 
Statistics Norway (1986) for the 1985 wave, Valen et al. (1990, Appendix B) for the 1989 
wave, Aardal et al. (1995) for the 1993 wave, Aardal et al. (1999) for the 1997 wave, and 
Aardal et al. (2003) for the 2001 election. 
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reasonably highly correlated, so results that hold on income are likely to 
be rather similar for wealth.  
 
Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics for Income  
Year Number of  observations 
1000
1997 kroner 
Relative to 
average ࣆ ࣌ 
1977 473 251.62 1.07 4.13 0.52 
 (145.41) (0.62) (0.01) (0.01) 
1981 1125 265.38 1.08 4.52 0.55 
 (159.65) (0.65) (0.01) (0.01) 
1985 1342 267.18 1.09 4.89 0.51 
 (156.75) (0.64) (0.01) (0.01) 
1989 1270 322.42 1.10 5.26 0.61 
 (214.17) (0.73) (0.01) (0.01) 
1993 1137 354.35 1.00 5.44 0.77 
 (196.03) (0.55) (0.002) (0.001) 
1997 1114 401.51 1.00 5.62 0.78 
 (221.77) (0.55) (0.002) (0.001) 
2001 557 451.72 1.00 5.85 0.73 
 (374.97) (0.83) (0.003) (0.001) 
Total 7018 325.93 1.05  
 (218.21) (0.65)  
Sample averages of income and income relative to year average by year, with standard deviations 
in parenthesis. Numbers up to 1989 are based on 100 simulations. Parameters ߤ and ߪ are 
estimated parameters based on a log normal distribution, used to simulate incomes throughout 
the paper. Results for 1993 to 2001 are only included for reference. Standard errors of the 
estimates in parenthesis. 
 
Throughout the paper, I group the parties into five groups. Each party 
group’s vote share in the sample and at the elections are given in Table 2. 
The Socialist parties consist of the Socialist Left party as well as the 
Norwegian Communist Party and the Workers’ Communist Party. The 
second group is the Labour party. As this is the largest group, I use it as 
the reference group. Then follows the Centrist parties which consist of the 
Centre Party, the Liberal party (Venstre), the Liberal Popular Party, and 
the Christian Popular Party. The Conservative party (Høyre) is grouped 
alone as is the Progress party. There seems to be a slight under reporting 
of voting Progress relative to the outcomes of elections, but otherwise the 
data seem to reflect the actual outcomes fairly well.  
The best overview of Norway’s political history and political landscape 
up to the 1960s is still Rokkan (1967). In his path breaking study, he 
distinguished between five dimensions of conflict in Norwegian politics. 
These are (1) the territorial (center vs. periphery), (2) the sociocultural, (3) 
the religious, (4) an economic conflict on the commodity market 
(producers vs. buyers of agricultural products), and finally (5) an 
economic conflict on the labour market. For our purposes, the last 
cleavage, which corresponds to the traditional division between 
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(economic) right and left, is the important one. Over the last 30 years, this 
has also probably been the most important one. Rasch (2003) reviews a 
number of studies who attempt to order the Norwegian parties from left 
to right using survey data on electors, interview of politicians and political 
experts, studies of party programs, and studies of parliamentary voting. 
Quite generally, these studies support the ordering Socialist-Labour- 
Centrist-Conservative-Progress. The Progress Party, however, is some-
what unclear and is placed between Labour and Centrist by some studies. 
For this reason, I consider the Conservative party as the advocate for low 
taxes and study to what extent Conservative voting is associated with high 
incomes. 
 
Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics for Party Choice  
Year Socialist Labour Centre Conservative Progress Total 
1977 29 208 110 122 4 473 
 6.1 44.0 23.3 25.8 0.9 100 
 4.6 42.3 21.2 24.5 1.9 94.5 
1981 63 437 233 353 39 1,125  
 5.6 38.8 20.7 31.4 3.5 100 
 6.0 37.1 17.0 31.8 4.5 96.4 
1985 90 505 286 419 42 1,342  
 6.7 37.6 21.3 31.2 3.1 100 
 6.1 40.8 18.5 30.4 3.7 99.5 
1989 163 446 257 280 124 1,270  
 12.8 35.1 20.2 22.1 9.8 100 
 10.1 34.3 18.2 22.2 13.0 97.8 
1993 103 470 322 192 50 1,137  
 9.1 41.3 28.3 16.9 4.4 100 
 9.0 36.9 28.2 17.0 6.3 97.4 
1997 95 404 328 181 106 1,114  
 8.5 36.3 29.4 16.3 9.5 100 
 7.8 35.0 26.1 14.3 15.3 98.5 
2001 84 132 148 145 48 557 
 15.1 23.7 26.6 26.0 8.6 100 
 13.8 24.3 21.9 21.2 14.6 95.8 
Total 627 2,602 1,684 1,692 413 7,018  
 8.9 37.1 24.0 24.1 5.9 100 
First row is number of observations in sample, second year-specific percentage, and third result 
of elections. 
 
This is also confirmed by respondents’ response to questions regarding 
their preferences over policy issues. Figure 2 show the fraction of 
respondents who oppose tax cuts and favour extensions of social security 
by party preference. As both of these answers relate to an extended scope 
of government, we should expect left wing voters to be more positive to 
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the proposed changes. The figure shows that respondents who vote for left 
wing parties also oppose tax cuts and favour social security extensions. 
 
Figure 2 - Preferences for Tax Cuts and Extensions of Social Security by Party 
Preference.  
 
Sample is 1977-97. “Oppose tax cut” are respondents who answer that they oppose or op- pose 
strongly reductions in the tax rate of high incomes versus those who favour it, favour it strongly, 
or indifferent. “Favour social security” are respondents who say they favour extensions versus 
oppose it or indifferent. 
4 Results from the Basic Models 
The results from estimation of the baseline models described above are 
given in columns (1) to (3) of Table 3. These estimations include income 
and a vector of control variables consisting of age, two categories of 
education, and dummy variables for sex, marital status, student, retired, 
staying at home, employed in the public sector, having zero income, and 
year.12 Sex and age are omitted for the fixed effects model. I have reported 
results from random effects models on the whole sample and restricting 
the sample to respondents who vote for different parties in the two waves 
                                                 
12 The reason for not including number of children in the control variables is that this 
variable first appeared in the survey in 1985. I have ran estimations on the last five 
periods including number of children; the estimates do not change much (estimates not 
reported). I have also tried to use income per capita or income adjusted by the OECD 
equivalence scale. Results are still qualitatively unchanged. 
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of interviews as well as from the fixed effects models. All the models 
contain year specific dummies and a dummy for the agent being in his 
second period of observation. The latter, however, is redundant in the 
fixed effects model.13 
 
Table 3 - Effect of Relative Income on Party Choice 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Random effects Random effects Fixed effects Hausman test 
Socialist -0.269 -0.106 0.014 0.414 
 (0.202) (0.175) (0.357) [0.340] 
Centre -0.615 -0.077 -0.114 2.421 
 (0.207) (0.150) (0.158) [0.008] 
Conservative 1.090 0.361 0.191 2.142 
 (0.184) (0.145) (0.251) [0.016] 
Progress 0.123 -0.033 -0.305 1.048 
 (0.233) (0.190) (0.378) [0.147] 
  
Joint test  19.94 
  [0.00051] 
Log likelihood -7560.0 -2556.1 -463.2  
Observations 3509 890 890  
Time frame 1977-2001
Sample Full Changers Changers  
Values in columns (1) to (3) are coefficient on income measured relative to period averages with 
standard errors in parenthesis. Control variables are age, two categories of education, and 
dummy variables for sex, marital status, student, retired, staying at home, employed in the public 
sector, having zero income, and year. Sex and age are omitted for the fixed effects model.  
Hausman test is for equality of parameters between columns (1) and (3), with joint being the test 
of all four parameters being jointly equal. p-values are in square brackets. 
Estimation is by simulated maximum likelihood with 100 simulations per observation. 
 
Income relative to annual averages is the main measure of income 
throughout the paper. Appendix Table A1 reports estimates using income 
in absolute terms (CPI adjusted to 2001). To facilitate reading of the 
results, I only report the estimated parameter on income; the full 
estimation results as well as the estimated covariance matrices of the 
random effects estimators are available upon request.  
To test the validity of the political economy approach to voting 
behaviour, the most interesting estimates are the income coefficients on 
the Conservative party. The coefficient is positive and significantly 
different from zero in both random effects models. This is similar to the 
evidence in Figure 1. When we restrict attention to party changers, the 
                                                 
13 When we both have an individual fixed effect and a year dummy, introducing a 
dummy for the second period would result in perfect multicollinearity. This is similar to 
the difficulty of observing individual, year, and cohort effects. 
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estimated parameter is much smaller than for the full sample. Already, we 
see a tendency for conservative voters being rich, but that party changes 
only to a limited degree can be explained by income. The results from the 
fixed effects estimations confirm these results: Here the estimated 
parameter on the Conservative party is even lower, and it is now 
insignificant. Hence when we control for unobserved characteristics, 
income has very little explanatory power on Conservative voting.14 
Another interesting feature of Table 3 is that the socialist parties, which 
according to the theories of Section 2 should attract the poorest voters, 
rather seem to attract voters with a relatively high income. But this effect 
is much smaller than for the Conservative party in all specifications, and 
in the fixed effects specification it even has a positive sign. Also, the 
parameter is not significantly different from zero at any conventional level 
of confidence in any of the specification. This may, however, be due to the 
reference party being Labour, which also is located toward the left wing. 
The Progress party, which is often judged as a populist right-wing 
party, is slightly troublesome as the estimated parameters do not have a 
consistent sign. These estimates are also generally not significantly 
different from zero. This may be explained by the fact that the party to a 
large extent gets “protest votes”. Throughout the period, it was also seen 
as unlikely that the party would take part in government. Finally, 
particularly at the end of the sample period, the party’s ideology started to 
include some more left-wing components such as increased emphasis on 
the public responsibility for the welfare of senior citizens. 
Estimation results from the control variables are not reported. Some 
general significant trends are that age has some impact on increasing 
support for the Socialist and Progress parties, students tend to vote 
Socialist and to not vote for the Centre and Progress parties whereas the 
effect is the opposite for the retired. High education tends to reduce the 
likelihood of voting Labour, whereas public sector employment increases 
the probability of voting Socialist and reduce the probability of voting 
Conservative and Progress. Finally, women are more likely to vote 
Socialist and Labour. 
To test whether the observed difference are statistically significant, 
Column (4) of Table 3 reports the results from Hausman tests for 
differences in parameter estimates. The tests are between the full sample 
random effects specification reported in Column (1) against the fixed 
                                                 
14 One might worry that as we compare different model specifications, the error term has 
different variances resulting in different scaling of the parameters. This would not affect 
the marginal effect on the choice probabilities reported in Appendix Table A2 however. 
As the qualitative results are the same for Tables 3 and A2, this is not a problem. 
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS, Vol.1, Issue 2 - Fall 2010, Article 5 
Copyright © 2010 University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved 15 
 
effects estimates reported in column (3).15 Each of the estimated parame-
ters on income are tested individually, and a joint test of all four being 
jointly equal is also included. The joint test clearly rejects equality at all 
reasonable levels of significance. It is seen that this is mainly driven by the 
differences occurring between the estimates on the parameters for the 
Conservative and the Centre parties. 
Estimation using income in price adjusted levels rather than relative 
income reported in Appendix Table A1 gives qualitatively very similar 
consolations. The figures reported in Table 3 should be interpreted as 
parameters in a linearized utility function for voting a given party. It may 
also be of interest to look at the effect of income on choice probabilities. If 
ߚ௝ is the coefficient on party j and ௝ܲ the probability of voting for the party, 
then we see that 
 
డ௉ೕ
డ௬ ൌ ௝ܲ൫ߚ௝ െ ̅ߚ൯                                                (3) 
 
where ̅ߚ ൌ ∑ ௝ܲ ߚ௝. Estimated choice probabilities corresponding to the 
estimates of Table 3 are reported in Appendix Table A2, where the ௝ܲs 
used are the sample means. Increasing the income by an amount equal to 
the mean income is seen to increase the probability of voting Conservative 
by a substantial amount, about 25%, in the random effects models on the 
whole sample. Restricting the sample to party changers and by using the 
fixed effects specification, however, the effect is reduced to about 7% and 
5%. 
To conclude this section, it seems that income has a positive effect on 
Conservative voting. The effect is reduced strongly by focusing on party 
changers and even more when introducing individual fixed effects. In the 
latter case, the estimate is reduced by a factor of about 5 relative to the 
standard random effects specification. I interpret this as income having a 
smaller effect on Conservative voting when we control for unobserved 
effects correlated with income. Consequently, by just observing a positive 
correlation between income and Conservative voting, we tend to overstate 
the causal effect of income. 
                                                 
15 It may seem illicit to compare estimation from different samples. The fixed effects 
estimate, however, may be treated as using the whole sample where respondents who do 
not change party simply do not provide any additional information. Consequently, this 
approach is warranted.  
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5 Model Specification and Measurement Error 
Generally, to test how robust the results found above are, I now 
undertake a number of robustness checks. First, a common parameter on 
income was estimated for the whole sample in the baseline specification. 
One may worry that as party platforms have changed over the years, the 
effect of income on party preferences have also changed. To see whether 
there is a problem of parameter instability, I have rerun the estimations 
allowing the parameters on income to vary over time. The upper panel of 
Table 4 shows results from estimations where the sample was split 
between 1985 and 1989. It is seen that there is a slight tendency for the 
parameter on the Conservative party to decline over time. However, for 
the estimators using party changers and fixed effects, we cannot reject the 
LR test of no break at a 5% level of confidence. 
 
Figure 3 - Year Specific Coefficients on Income in the Three Specifications  
 
Notes: Fixed effects estimator as solid line, random effects estimator on party changers as 
dashed line, and random effects estimator on full sample as dotted line. 
 
If we allow for a separate coefficient in each year, we still cannot reject 
LR tests of no structural change for the fixed effects model, but now both 
random effects models rejects no structural break at the 5% level. Figure 3 
shows the estimated parameters for each year. We see that almost all 
parameters have a tendency to fall, indicating increased Labour voting 
among high income respondents. Focusing on the Conservative party, we 
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS, Vol.1, Issue 2 - Fall 2010, Article 5 
Copyright © 2010 University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved 17 
 
also see that we have the same ranking of estimates: Full sample random 
effects indicates a large, albeit falling, effect of income on conservative 
voting, the changers sample random effects a smaller effect, and the fixed 
effects the smallest effect. 
 
Table 4 - Stability of the Income Parameters over Time 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Random effects Random effects Fixed effects 
One cut   
 Socialist Income -0.467 -0.157 0.183 
   (0.247) (0.193) (0.453) 
  Income × 
before '85 
0.439 0.140 -0.242 
  (0.363) (0.343) (0.619) 
 Centre Income -1.250 -0.323 -0.220 
   (0.270) (0.178) (0.229) 
  Income ×  
before '85 
1.462 0.732 0.803 
  (0.355) (0.280) (0.436) 
 Conservative Income 0.625 0.162 0.032 
   (0.233) (0.160) (0.319) 
  Income × 
before '85 
1.218 0.608 0.680 
  (0.329) (0.270) (0.463) 
 Progress Income -0.358 -0.210 -0.520 
   (0.282) (0.209) (0.447) 
  Income × 
before '85 
1.306 0.606 0.818 
  (0.427) (0.388) (0.629) 
 log L  -7549.79 -2551.67 -460.59 
χଶ(4)  20.35 8.95 5.19 
   [4.27x10-4] [0.06] [0.27] 
    
Full specification   
 Log likelihood   -7528.57 -2533.92 -448.02 
 χଶ (24)  62.79 44.46 30.33 
   [2.55x10-5] [0.01] [0.17] 
 Time frame  1977-2001
 Sample  Full Changers Changers 
 Observations  3509 890 890 
Figures in the first panel are coefficients on income relative to period average and income 
interacted with a dummy for being observed between 1977 and 1985. Control variables are as in 
Table 3. χଶ (4) is a LR test for structural break, comparing estimates with Table 3. Standard errors 
are in parenthesis, p-values in square brackets.  
The second panel reports log likelihood for the specification with separate income parameters for 
each year χଶ (24) is a LR test for the parameters being different, comparing estimates with Table 
3. Estimation is by simulated maximum likelihood with 100 simulations per individual. 
 
As estimation is carried out using panel data techniques I only use data 
on respondents who voted in both periods of interview. We could fear 
that this leads to a selection bias. To see whether this is that case, I have 
rerun the estimations including abstention as a separate “party ”. This has 
Lind: Do the Rich Vote Conservative Because They Are Rich? 
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/18 18 
 
very little effect on the other estimates, so I have not included these 
estimates. 
 
Table 5 - Differences between Increasing and Decreasing Income 
   (1) (2) (3) 
   Random effects Random effects Fixed effects 
 Socialist Income -0.170 -0.183 -0.485 
   (0.230) (0.191) (0.629) 
  Income × 
Income up 
-0.180 0.172 1.027 
  (0.212) (0.159) (0.945) 
 Centre Income -0.517 -0.135 0.228 
   (0.246) (0.164) (0.509) 
  Income × 
Income up 
-0.156 0.124 -0.392 
  (0.261) (0.137) (0.571) 
 Conservative Income 1.246 0.394 0.621 
   (0.240) (0.156) (0.550) 
  Income × 
Income up 
-0.240 -0.072 -0.613 
  (0.240) (0.140) (0.736) 
 Progress Income 0.427 0.016 0.345 
   (0.273) (0.204) (0.656) 
  Income × 
Income up 
-0.647 -0.114 -1.227 
  (0.281) (0.189) (1.040) 
 χଶ (4)  6.39 3.52 3.42 
   [0.17] [0.48] [0.49] 
 Log likelihood  -7556.8 -2554.3 -461.5 
 Observations  3509 890 890 
 Time frame  1977-2001
 Sample  Full Changers Changers 
Figures are coefficients on income relative to period average and this variable interacted with a 
dummy for income increasing between the two periods of observation. Control variables are as in 
Table 3. ߯ଶ (4) is an LR test on all four interaction terms being zero. Standard errors are in 
parenthesis, p-values in square brackets. Estimation is by simulated maximum likelihood with 100 
simulations per individual. 
 
The fixed effects estimator is essentially based on studying whether a 
change in income tends to push voters toward or away from a party. We 
may, however, expect an increase and a decrease to have non-symmetrical 
effects. Table 5 show results from estimations that study this. Here I have 
interacted income with a dummy variable for increasing income from the 
first to the second period of interviews. The first thing to notice is that the 
coefficients on the interaction terms are not jointly significant in any of the 
specifications, so there is no clear sign of asymmetrical effects of income 
changes. However, the interaction with increased income seems to have a 
negative coefficient in many specifications, particularly for the 
Conservative and the Progress parties. This indicates that an income 
increase has less of an effect of pulling voters to the Conservative party 
than a decline has of pushing them away. Overall, there also seems to be a 
slight tendency for voters to go toward Labour when the income declines. 
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This could be motivated by Labour being seen as a safer party than other 
choices.  
For the fixed effects estimator, we only use data on the agents that 
change party during the two periods. It is possible that those who change 
their party have preferences that differ from those who stay with the same 
party in both periods, i.e. we don’t have external validity. Obviously, we 
cannot test this with results from the fixed effects estimator, but results 
from the random effects estimator give us some insight. Table 6 reports 
results from an estimation where income has been interacted with a 
dummy for voting for different parties in the two periods of observation.  
 
Table 6 - Differences between Party Changers and Party Stayers 
 Random effects 
Socialist Income -0.856 
  (0.201) 
 Income × changer 1.522 
 (0.199) 
Centre Income -0.995 
  (0.216) 
 Income × changer 1.084 
 (0.234) 
Conservative Income 0.856 
  (0.183) 
 Income × changer 0.566 
 (0.202) 
Progress Income -0.829 
  (0.277) 
 Income × changer 2.219 
 (0.304) 
χଶ (4)  61.0 
  [1.82x10-12] 
Log likelihood  -7529.5 
Observations  3509 
Time frame  1977-2001 
Sample  Full 
Figures are coefficients on income relative to period average and this variable interacted with a 
dummy for voting for different parties in the two periods of observation. Control variables are as 
in Table 3. χଶ is an LR test on all four interaction terms being zero. Standard errors are in 
parenthesis, p-values in square brackets. Estimation is by simulated maximum likelihood with 100 
simulations per individual. 
 
The first thing to notice is that an LR test of all the interaction terms 
being zero is rejected at a very high level of significance, so there seems to 
be differences between party changers and party stayers. Furthermore, it 
seems that income is a better predictor of Conservative voting for party 
changers than for party stayers. For the other three party groups, the effect 
seems to be the contrary. To get an idea of who the party changers and 
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party stayers are, Tables 7 and 8 report some summary statistics on party 
choices and demographic characteristics of changers and stayers. Table 7 
show that there is higher volatility in voting for parties at the extremes, i.e. 
Socialist or Progress. 
 
Table 7 - Fraction Changing Party 
Party Fraction changing from Fraction changing to 
Socialist 0.41 0.42 
Labour 0.18 0.17 
Centre 0.23 0.26 
Conservative 0.26 0.23 
Progress 0.51 0.57 
Total 0.25 0.25 
Fraction of voters who report voting for different parties in the two periods by voting pattern in 
the first and second period. 
 
Hence party changers have a higher tendency for having voted for one of 
these party groups in one of the periods of observation.  
 
Table 8 - Characteristics of Party Changers and Party Stayers 
  Averages Logit 
  Stayers Changers Difference  
Income 1.05 1.06 0.004 -0.093 
  (0.014) (0.025) (0.029) (0.077) 
Change in income -0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.029 
  (0.011) (0.024) (0.024) (0.074) 
Absolute value of 0.36 0.40 -0.04 0.135 
change in income (0.008) (0.020) (0.019) (0.088) 
Age 48.79 43.62 5.17 -0.022 
  (0.291) (0.477) (0.571) (0.003) 
Female 0.48 0.46 0.01 -0.004 
  (0.010) (0.016) (0.019) (0.079) 
Low education 0.42 0.37 0.06 -0.105 
  (0.009) (0.016) (0.019) (0.170) 
Middle education 0.23 0.20 0.03 -0.064 
  (0.008) (0.013) (0.016) (0.185) 
High education 0.35 0.43 -0.09 0.119 
  (0.009) (0.016) (0.018) (0.156) 
Average values for certain descriptive statistics for voters reporting voting for the same party and 
different parties in the two periods. Variables are measured in the last period of observation, 
except changes in income. Forth column is results from a logit model where all variables are 
combined to explain party change. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
Table 8 shows the average of certain demographic characteristics of 
respondents who voted for the same party and different parties in the two 
periods as well as results from a logit estimation of the probability of 
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changing party. We see that the income level and the change in income 
between the two periods is almost the same, and does not turn out to be 
significant in the logit estimation. Large changes in income in absolute 
value, however, tends to increase the probability of changing party. Age 
also seem to have an impact on the probability of changing party: Party 
changers are generally younger whereas older voters seems to have found 
“their” party to a larger extent. Men and women seems to have 
approximately the same propensity to change parties, but there is some 
tendency that higher education increases the probability of changing 
party. However, the effect of education disappears in the multivariate 
logit analysis, so this may to a large extent be due to highly educated 
voters being younger on average than less educated voters. 
An important caveat with the results presented above is that income is 
likely to be measured with error as the data are based on stated recall of 
last year’s income. As usual, this induces an attenuation bias in the results. 
Furthermore, it is likely that measurement error is more marked in the 
fixed effects model. The reason is that income is more persistent than the 
measurement error, so the signal to noise ratio is lower on first differences 
than on levels. Hence the lower estimate of the effect of income in the 
fixed effects model than the random effects model may simply be the 
result of measurement error. As the variance of the measurement error is 
unknown, we have to attempt some instrumental variables-type estimator. 
Assume that we have an instrument that is correlated with the true 
income, uncorrelated with the measurement error, and that doesn’t 
influence party preferences. For the probit model with normally 
distributed measurement errors, a number of consistent estimators have 
been developed (Nelson and Olson, 1978; Newey, 1986). However, as I 
want to use a fixed effects model, the probit framework is not usable. 
I suggest to use a two-stage estimator closely related to the ones 
suggested by Rivers and Vuong (1988) and Stefanski and Buzas (1995), 
which in their words is approximately consistent, i.e. it converges in 
probability to a value approximately equal to the true value. A detailed 
exposition of the estimator is found in Appendix B.3. The main ingredients 
are to run a first stage where the explanatory variable measured with error 
is regressed on the instruments and then estimate the logit model using 
the predicted values from the first stage. The residuals from the first stage 
are also included to improve the accuracy of the estimator. 
To instrument for income, I use two instruments. The first is the 
average income of agents of the respondent’s profession, measured at the 
two-digit level using the NYK classification (which is almost identical to 
the ISIC-58 standard, see Arbeidsdirektoratet, 1995 for details), using the 
whole sample to calculate the means. The second is year specific averages 
of the one digit NYK classification to get more variability over time. The 
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coding of profession was changed in the 2001 round of the survey, so I 
only use data from 1977 to 1997 for the IV estimations. 
The results are shown in Table 9. The most striking result is that the 
estimated coefficients are numerically much larger indicating the presence 
of measurement error in the reported incomes.  
 
Table 9 - Determinants of Opinions on Economic Policy 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Random effects Random effects Fixed effects 
A  Against tax cuts -0.700 -0.066 -0.071 
 Ordinary logit (0.080) (0.097) (0.125) 
 Log likelihood -3400.6 -1201.9 -592.8 
 Observations 2846 896 896 
   
B  For social security extension -0.261 -0.023 -0.045 
 Ordinary logit (0.088) (0.109) (0.151) 
 Log likelihood -3076.9 -1029.6 -496.7 
 Observations 2846 853 853 
   
C  Against tax cuts -1.470 -0.427 -0.687 
 Instrumental variables (0.295) (0.453) (0.650) 
 Log likelihood -3078.28 -1097.28 -539.096 
 Observations 2642 812 812 
   
D  For social security extension -0.382 -0.220 -0.301 
 Instrumental variables (0.325) (0.479) (0.712) 
 Log likelihood -2977.16 -952.654 -459.98 
 Observations 2642 816 816 
   
 Time frame 1977-1997
 Sample Full Changers Changers 
Estimates are coefficient on income measured relative to period averages. Standard errors in 
parenthesis. Control variables are as in Table 3, instruments as in Table 9.  
Variable “Against tax cut” is one for respondents who answered that they oppose or oppose 
strongly tax cuts for high incomes and zero for respondents who answer that they favour it, 
favour it strongly, or don’t know. Variable “For social security extension” is one for respondents 
who answered that they favour or favour strongly extensions of social security, zero for 
respondents who answered that they oppose it, oppose it strongly, or don’t know. 
Estimation is by simulated maximum likelihood with 100 simulations per observation 
 
 Furthermore, the increase in the parameter values seems to be as large 
for the random effects models as the fixed effects model, so the lower 
value in the fixed effects model was not driven by measurement error. 
Otherwise, the pattern is similar to above: Income has a large and 
significantly positive effect on preferences for the Conservative party in 
the random effects model, but the parameter becomes smaller and 
insignificant once fixed effects are introduced. One objection to these 
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results may be that the instrument is invalid as average salary of your 
profession may be a signal of future income. This would then be an 
omitted variable in both the baseline estimation and the instrumental 
variables approach. Call the true coefficient on salary by profession ߨ and 
the bivariate regression coefficient between salary by profession on 
income b. In a linear model, the coefficient on income from an OLS 
estimation would converge to ሺߚ ൅ ߨܾሻߪ௬ଶ ൫ߪ௬ଶ ൅ ߪ௨ଶ൯ൗ , a combination of the 
well known results of the effects of omitted variables and errors in 
variables. If we still include income as the sole explanatory variable, but 
instrument it with average income by salary, the estimated coefficient 
converge in probability to ሺߚ ൅ ߨܾሻ. It is probably possible to prove similar 
results for logit models. This show that even if the instruments should 
have been included as an explanatory variable, the increase in the 
estimated parameter values stems from the removal of measurement 
error. As Table 9 shows that the increase is larger for the random effects 
models than the fixed effects model, this indicates that the drop in the 
estimate for the fixed effects model in Table 3 cannot be caused by 
measurement error in the income variable.  
6 Public Policy Opinions and Party Choice 
So far I have only considered the determinants of voting whereas the 
literature deals mostly with preferences over taxation and redistribution. 
The main reason for concentrating on party choice is a revealed 
preference-argument: It is probably easier to say that you favour 
redistribution than to actually vote for a party that favours redistribution 
in a way that may be costly to you. Norway being an egalitarian social 
democracy, there may also be social norms that makes it harder for some 
to admit that they want low taxes and don’t care about supporting the 
poor. 
Still, it is interesting to see how income and indicators of expectations of 
income changes affect opinions on economic policy. Table 10 reports 
results from binomial panel data logit estimations with random and fixed 
effects. Panel A studies the response to a question on whether the 
respondent favour a tax cut for those with high incomes. I distinguish 
between those who answer that they oppose it or oppose it strongly 
against those who favour it, favour it strongly, or are indifferent. Panel B 
reports results from a question on whether the respondent believes that 
social security should be expanded, versus leaving it as it is today or 
reducing it. Panels C and D study the same outcomes using the 
instrumental variables technique from Section 5. 
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From column (1) of Panel A, we see that in the whole sample, high 
income is associated with preferences for tax cuts. The coefficient is both 
numerically relatively large and strongly significantly different from zero. 
However, we notice that for the sample of agents that changes their 
opinion on tax cuts, reported in column (2), income has an insignificant, 
but slightly positive effect on opposing tax cuts. This is also clear when we 
use the fixed effects estimator reported in column (3). Hence it seems that 
richer agents favour tax cuts, but an income rise is not a cause of starting 
to favour tax cuts, so there does not seem to be a causal relationship. 
 
Table 10 - Determinants of Opinions on Economic Policy 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Random effects Random effects Fixed effects 
A  Against tax cuts -0.700 -0.066 -0.071 
 Ordinary logit (0.080) (0.097) (0.125) 
 Log likelihood -3400.6 -1201.9 -592.8 
 Observations 2846 896 896 
   
B  For social security extension -0.261 -0.023 -0.045 
 Ordinary logit (0.088) (0.109) (0.151) 
 Log likelihood -3076.9 -1029.6 -496.7 
 Observations 2846 853 853 
   
C  Against tax cuts -1.470 -0.427 -0.687 
 Instrumental variables (0.295) (0.453) (0.650) 
 Log likelihood -3078.28 -1097.28 -539.096 
 Observations 2642 812 812 
   
D For social security extension -0.382 -0.220 -0.301 
 Instrumental variables (0.325) (0.479) (0.712) 
 Log likelihood -2977.16 -952.654 -459.98 
 Observations 2642 816 816 
   
 Time frame 1977-1997
 Sample Full Changers Changers 
Estimates are coefficient on income measured relative to period averages. Standard errors in 
parenthesis. Control variables are as in Table 3, instruments as in Table 9.  
Variable “Against tax cut” is one for respondents who answered that they oppose or oppose 
strongly tax cuts for high incomes and zero for respondents who answer that they favour it, 
favour it strongly, or don’t know. Variable “For social security extension” is one for respondents 
who answered that they favour or favour strongly extensions of social security, zero for 
respondents who answered that they oppose it, oppose it strongly, or don’t know. 
Estimation is by simulated maximum likelihood with 100 simulations per observation 
 
Panel B confirms to a large extent the conclusions above. For the whole 
sample, income has the predicted negative effect on preferences for social 
security extensions. The coefficient is also significantly different from zero. 
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For the opinion changing sample, income has an negative effect, but it is 
now much smaller and insignificant. The same is true when we introduce 
fixed effects. Hence again, rich agents tend to oppose social security 
extensions, but probably not because they are rich in itself. 
In Panel C we return to the opinions on tax cuts for the rich, now using 
instrumental variables to correct for measurement error in stated income. 
As in Table 9, estimated coefficients are numerically considerably larger, 
indicating the presence of measurement error. For the full sample, income 
is seen to have a strong negative effect on opposition to tax cuts. Again, if 
we look at those changing opinions, the effect becomes much smaller, but 
the reductions seem to be less strong than above. This may indicate that a 
part of the result stated above was due to more measurement error in the 
income of those who change their opinion (in the sense of their error 
having larger variance). Nonetheless, it again turns out that changes in 
income only has a limited effect on changes in opinion on tax cuts. The 
conclusions seem to be about the same for Panel D where the instrumental 
variables estimator is employed on the stated opinion on social security 
extensions. 
7 Conclusion 
Although there may seem to be a positive relationship between high 
income and Conservative voting as predicted by most political economy 
models, this may be due to factors like social background and learning 
about the working of the economy. In this paper I have used panel data 
discrete choice models to extract the pure causal effect of income by 
looking at income changes over a limited period of time and their impact 
on changes in voting behaviour. The result is that income has a causal 
effect on Conservative voting, but the effect is smaller in magnitude than 
what we find using traditional tools. The reduction in magnitude seems to 
be in the order of a magnitude of five. 
The same is true for stated opinions on tax cuts and extension of social 
security. High income respondents tend to favour tax cuts and oppose 
social security extensions, but changes in these opinions are only to a 
limited degree explained by changes in income and does not survive 
inclusion of individual fixed effects. Opinions in favour of tax cuts and 
reductions in social security seem to induce Conservative voting as we 
would expect, but the effect of income on party choice is virtually 
unchanged from including these opinion variables. 
Thus income has most effect on party choice and political preferences in 
the long run, possibly over several generations. As income levels are quite 
persistent, this can explain why high income respondents tend to vote 
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Conservative and favour a small welfare budget. There could be several 
explanations for this. One is that permanent income is more relevant for 
preferences than transitory income (Lind, 2007). As a change in annual 
income may not have a large impact on lifetime income, we may not 
expect it to have a large impact on voting. However, it is not obvious that 
permanent income is more important than current income, given that 
politics are quite volatile over time. We could also envisage a more 
sociological impact where a high income tends to socialize people into 
different groups or classes with different views and beliefs, so people vote 
in accordance with who they think they are. These perceptions are only 
changing slowly, which explains why income only has an effect in the 
long run. It seems that the traditional political economy models, although 
not proven to be wrong, only tell a part of the story. Unobserved 
characteristics correlated with income has almost the same impact on 
voting as income. 
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A  Additional Estimation Results 
Table A1 - Effect of Income in Constant Prices on Party Choice 
 (4) (1) (3) 
 Random effects Random effects Fixed effects 
Socialist -0.273 -0.131 -0.107 
 (0.094) (0.074) (0.166) 
Centre -0.577 -0.159 -0.065 
 (0.091) (0.061) (0.084) 
Conservative 0.110 0.005 0.034 
 (0.038) (0.035) (0.137) 
Progress -0.215 -0.096 -0.234 
 (0.081) (0.074) (0.186) 
Log likelihood -7575.0 -2557.8 -462.5 
Observations 3509 890 890 
Time frame 1977-2001
Sample Full Changers Changers 
Values are coefficient on income measured in 100 000 1997-NOK. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
Control variables are as in Table 3. Estimation is by simulated maximum likelihood with 100 
simulations per observation. 
 
Table A2 - Marginal Effect of Income on Choice Probabilities 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Random effects Random effects Fixed effects 
Socialist -0.040 -0.015 0.001 
 (0.016) (0.013) (0.029) 
Centre -0.178 -0.032 -0.030 
 (0.032) (0.023) (0.028) 
Conservative 0.258 0.073 0.050 
 (0.032) (0.022) (0.041) 
Progress 0.002 -0.006 -0.017 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.019) 
Log likelihood -7560.0 -2556.1 -463.2 
Observations 3509 890 890 
Time frame 1977-2001
Sample Full Changers Changers 
Numbers are the estimated marginal effect of income relative to period averages on choice 
probabilities. Marginal effects are calculated at sample means. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
Control variables are as in Table 3. Estimation is by simulated maximum likelihood with 100 
simulations per observation. 
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B  Details on the Estimation Procedure  
B.1 Multiple Institutional Indicators 
Preferences over different parties are described by 
 
ݒ௜௝௧ ൌ ߙ௜௝௧ ൅ ߚ௝ݕ௜௧ ൅ ߛ௝ݖ௜௧ ൅ ߝ௜௝௧                              (A-1) 
 
ൌ ߙ௜௝௧ ൅ θ௝X௜௧ ൅ ߝ௜௝௧ 
 
 
where ௜ܺ௧ ൌ ሺݕ௜௧ ݖ′௜௧ሻ′ and ߠ௝ ൌ ൫ߚ௝ ߛ൯. From this specification, it follows 
that the probability of agent i choosing party j at date t is 
 
݌௜௝௧ ൌ
ୣ୶୮൫ఈ೔ೕ೟ା஘ೕଡ଼೔೟൯
∑ ୣ୶୮ሺఈ೔ೖ೟ା஘ೖଡ଼೔೟ሻೖ
                                         (A-2) 
 
In the random effects model, the individual effects are assumed to be 
distributed ሺα௜ଵூ , … , α௜୒ூ ሻᇱ~NIDሺ0, ∑஑ሻ and the probability of choosing party 
j becomes 
 
݌௜௝௧ ൌ ׬ …஑౟భ಺ ׬
ୣ୶୮ቀఈೕ೟೅ ାఈೕುାఈ೔ೕ಺ ା஘ೕଡ଼೔೟ቁ
∑ ୣ୶୮ቀఈೖ೟೅ ାఈೖುାఈೖೕ಺ ା஘ೖଡ଼೔೟ቁೖ஑౟ొ
಺ ߶ሺα௜ଵூ , … , α௜୒ூ ; ∑஑ሻ ݀α௜ଵூ , … , ݀α௜୒ூ    (A-3) 
 
where ߶ሺ∙, ∑஑ሻ is the PDF of a multinomial normal distribution with mean 
zero and covariance matrix ∑஑. This expression is computed by Monte 
Carlo integration, i.e. by simulating the individual specific effects. For 
each individual, we make D draws ൛ߙ෤௜ଵூℓ … ߙ෤௜ேூℓ ൟℓୀଵ
஽
 from the appropriate 
normal distribution and replace (A-3) by 
 
݌෤௜௝௧ ൌ
ଵ
஽ ∑
ୣ୶୮ቀఈೕ೟೅ ାఈೕುାఈ෥೔ೕ಺ℓା஘ೕଡ଼೔೟ቁ
∑ ୣ୶୮ቀఈೖ೟೅ ାఈೖುାఈ෥ೖೕ಺ℓ ା஘ೖଡ଼೔೟ቁೖ
஽
ℓୀଵ                           (A-4) 
 
As D grows, ݌෤௜௝௧ converges to the exact value ݌௜௝௧. To enhance the 
efficiency of the simulation, antithetic variates are used (see e.g. Train, 
2003; Section 9.3.1). Adding the likelihoods over individuals and periods, 
we get the likelihood for the whole sample. Let ݒ௜௝௧ be a dummy taking the 
value 1 if individual i voted party j at time t, and 0 otherwise, and let ௜ܶ be 
the set of time periods in which individual i is observed. An 
approximation of the log likelihood for the whole sample is then 
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∑ ln ଵ஽ ∑ ∏ ∏ ቆ
ୣ୶୮ቀఈೕ೟೅ ାఈೕುାఈ෥೔ೕ಺ℓା஘ೕଡ଼೔೟ቁ
∑ ୣ୶୮ቀఈೖ೟೅ ାఈೖುାఈ෥ೖೕ಺ℓ ା஘ೖଡ଼೔೟ቁೖ
ቇ
௩೔ೕ೟
 ே௝ୀଵ௧∈்೔஽ℓୀଵ௜          (A-5) 
 
This expression is maximized to obtain estimates of the parameters of 
interest ߠ௝, as well as the period dummies ߙ௝௧்  and ߙ௝௉ and the values of the 
Cholesky decomposition of ∑஑. As in all models of discrete choice, we can 
only identify the effect of a variable on the choice of an alternative relative 
to another alternative. Hence we restrict ߠ௝ ൌ 0 for one party and impose 
the individual and time effects for the same alternative to be zero, so ∑஑, 
the covariance matrix of the individual effects, is in reality of dimension 
ܰ െ 1. 
B.2 The Fixed Effects Estimator 
Fixed effects are handled using Chamberlain’s (1980) conditional 
maximum likelihood estimator. The exposition here is limited to the case 
of two periods. For simplicity of notation I omit the period specific and 
second period effects. Then the probability that individual i votes for party 
݌ଵ and ݌ଶ in period 1 and 2 is 
 
exp൫ߙ௜௣భ
ூ ൅ θ௣భݔ௜ଵ൯
∑ expሺߙ௜௞ூ ൅ θ௞ݔ௜ଵሻ௞
 
exp൫ߙ௜௣మ
ூ ൅ θ௣మݔ௜ଶ൯
∑ expሺߙ௜௞ூ ൅ θ௞ݔ௜ଶሻ௞
 
 
If ݌ଵ ൌ ݌ଶ, we can perfectly predict the agent’s actions by letting 
ߙ௜௣భ
ூ ൌ ߙ௜௣మ
ூ → ∞ and ߙ௜௞ூ → െ∞ for ݇ ് ݌ଵ. Hence only those who vote for 
different parties give any information about the parameters of interest ߠ௝௞. 
Conditional on one of the two voting sequences ሺ݌ଵ, ݌ଶሻ or ሺ݌ଶ, ݌ଵሻ, the 
probability of the sequence ሺ݌ଵ, ݌ଶሻ is 
 
Prሺ݌ଵ, ݌ଶሻ
Prሺ݌ଵ, ݌ଶሻ ൅ Prሺ݌ଶ, ݌ଵሻ
 
 
For parties k for which i does not vote in any of the two periods, the 
likelihood is maximized by letting ߙ௜௞ூ → െ∞. We then get the conditional 
likelihood for individual i as 
  
ୣ୶୮൫஘೛భ௫೔భା஘೛మ௫೔మ൯
ୣ୶୮൫஘೛భ௫೔భା஘೛మ௫೔మ൯ାୣ୶୮൫஘೛మ௫೔భା஘೛భ௫೔మ൯
                            (A-7) 
 
which is easily maximized to obtain ML estimates of the parameters. 
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B.3 The Instrumental Variables Estimator 
Let ݕ௜௧∗  denote agent i’s (unobserved) true income and ݕ௜௧ ൌ ݕ௜௧∗ ൅ ݑ௜௧ 
denote the observed income with error. The error ݑ௜௧ is assumed to be iid 
ሺ0, ߪ௨ଶሻ across both i and t. The instrument ݓ௜௧ is assumed to satisfy ݕ௜௧∗ ൌ
ߨݓ௜௧ ൅ ݒ௜௧ where ߨ ് 0 and ݒ௜௧ is iid ሺ0, ߪ௩ଶሻ. In the first stage we regress ݕ௜௧ 
on ݓ௜௧. This gives a consistent estimate of ߨ, so the predicted value ݕො௜௧ 
converges in probability to ݕ௜௧∗ െ ݒ௜௧ when either the sample size or the 
number of time periods grows. Also, the residuals ݑit ൅ ݒitෟ  converge in 
probability to ݑit ൅ ݒit . The utility of voting party j is 
 
ݒ௜௝௧ ൌ ߙ௜௝௧ ൅ ߚ௝ݕ௜௧∗ ൅ ߛ௝ݖ௜௧ ൅ ߝ௜௝௧       (A-8) 
 
First, replacing ݕ௜௧∗  by ݕො௜௧ yields the equation 
 
ݒ௜௝௧
ሺଵሻ ൌ ߙ௜௝௧ ൅ ߚ௝ݕො௜௧ ൅ ߛ௝ݖ௜௧ ൅ ߝ௜௝௧
௣
→ ݒ௜௝௧ ൅ ߚ௝ݒ௜௧                  (A-9) 
 
 Here, ߚ௝ݒ௜௧, is an unobserved nuisance term. Although it is 
uncorrelated with ݕො௜௧, its variance tends to give a downward bias in the 
estimates, particularly if the correlation between ݕ௜௧∗  and ݓ௜௧ is low. To 
partially remedy this, I suggest to include ݑit ൅ ݒitෟ  as an additional 
regressor. 
This gives the model 
 
ݒ௜௝௧
ሺଶሻ ൌ ߙ௜௝௧ ൅ ߚ௝ݕො௜௧ ൅ ߚሙ௝ሺݑit ൅ ݒitෟ ሻ ൅ ߛ௝ݖ௜௧ ൅ ߝ௜௝௧
௣
→ ݒ௜௝௧ െ ߚሙ௝ݑ௜௧ ൅ ൫ߚ௝ െ ߚሙ௝൯ݒ௜௧ 
  (A-10) 
 
Now the nuisance term becomes െߚሙ௝ݑ௜௧ ൅ ൫ߚ௝ െ ߚሙ௝൯ݒ௜௧, which has a 
lower variance than ߚ௝ݒ௜௧. To see this, notice that ߚሙ௝
௣
→ ఙೡ
మ
ఙೠమାఙೡమ
ߚ௝ so the 
variance of the nuisance term in (A-10) approaches ఙೠ
మఙೡమ
ఙೠమାఙೡమ
ߚ௝ଶ whereas the 
variance of the nuisance term in (A-9) approaches ߪ௩ଶߚ௝ଶ ൒
ఙೠమఙೡమ
ఙೠమାఙೡమ
ߚ௝ଶ. 
Particularly, the nuisance term in (A-l0) disappears if either there is no 
measurement error, i.e. ߪ௨ଶ ൌ 0, or the instrument is perfect, i.e. ߪ௩ଶ ൌ 0. 
Nevertheless, the unobserved nuisance term leads to a downward bias in 
this case as well. 
  
Notice that we can estimate ߪ௨ଶ ൅ ߪ௩ଶ as the variance of ݑit ൅ ݒitෟ  and 
ఙೡమ
ఙೠమାఙೡమ
 
as the ratio ߚ௝ ߚሙ௝⁄  and hence derive estimates of ߪ௨ଶ and ߪ௩ଶ. This may help 
us to get an idea of the bias of the estimates. However, knowledge of the 
variance of the nuisance term in (A-l0) is probably not sufficient to get the 
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exact bias. Stefanski and Buzas (l995) discuss some possible adjustments 
based on knowledge of these variances, but their simulations indicate that 
the improvement in the accuracy of the estimator is not worth the increase 
in complexity of estimation, so I omit this from the present work.  
B.4 The Log Normal Simulation of Income  
We assume that income is log normally distributed, i.e. 
ln ݕ௜ ~ܰሺߤ, ߪଶሻ. Then we have 
 
Pr ቀݕ ൑ ݕ௜ ൑ ݕቁ ൌ Φ ቀ
୪୬௬ିఓ
ఙ ቁ െ Φ ቀ
୪୬௬ିఓ
ఙ ቁ    (A-11) 
 
where Φ is the standard normal CDF. We can estimate ߤ and ߪ are then 
estimated from the log likelihood function 
 
∑ ௚ܰீ௚ୀଵ ቂΦ ቀ
୪୬௬ത೒ିఓ
ఙ ቁ െ Φ ቀ
୪୬௬೒ିఓ
ఙ ቁቃ        (A-12) 
 
where G is the number of income groups, ௚ܰ is the number of individuals 
in group g and ݕത௚ and ݕ௚ the upper and lower incomes in the group. The 
estimated parameters for the relevant years are found in Table l of the 
main paper. Some respondents have reported zero income. They are left 
out of the estimation of ߤ and ߪ, and their income is kept at zero 
throughout the simulations. 
Let ࣦሺݕ௜, ݖ௜, Θሻ denote the appropriate log likelihood function for 
individual i who has income ݕ௜, other characteristics ݖ௜, and where Θ 
denotes the parameters to be estimated. We only know that ݕ௜ is in the 
interval ቀݕ, ݕቁ. Then the log likelihood given his income group, but 
ignoring his precise income, is 
 
ଵ
୊ቀ௬ቁି୊ሺ௬ሻ ׬ ࣦሺݕ௜, ݖ௜, Θሻ݀Fሺݕሻ,
௬
௬         (A-13) 
 
where F is the CDF of the income distribution, in this case the log 
normal. To calculate this integral, I simulate the income of the agent by 
making a number of draws from the log normal distribution with the 
appropriate parameters, conditional on the agent being in his income 
group. 
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